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1 Introduction
The civil justice system has been in a constant flux in
the past decades due to changes in society and litigants’
behaviour, as well as the increased factual and legal
complexity of cases. The number of cases has been
steadily increasing in many countries while the available
budget required for more judicial staff, improving judi-
cial case management, digitalisation of processes, and
the required specialisation, has not in all instances
increased at the same pace. This was worsened as a
result of the recent financial crisis that affected many
countries around the globe and has prompted govern-
ments to cut back on public expenditure. Austerity fur-
ther challenges the demands of effective justice within a
reasonable time,1 as is in the European context notably
enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR).2 The financial crisis also led to
a decrease in the funding of legal aid by the government
in a number of countries, challenging access to justice
for more vulnerable litigants in particular.
The present issue (8:4) of Erasmus Law Review results
from one of the sessions of the XV World Congress of
Procedural Law of the International Association of Proce-
dural Law in 2015, dedicated to ‘Effective Judicial Relief
and Remedies in an Age of Austerity’.3 It focuses on the
role of simplified civil procedures against the back-
ground of austerity. The articles included in this issue
are fully redrafted versions of a selection of the national
reports prepared for the general report for this confer-
ence, authored by the present editors.4 Simplified pro-
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versity Rotterdam, and Deputy Judge at the District Court of Rotter-
dam. Shusuke Kakiuchi is a professor at the University of Tokyo.
1. A.A.S. Zuckerman, Civil Justice in Crisis: Comparative Perspectives of
Civil Procedure, OUP, 1999, at 3-52 pointed out the delay in civil pro-
cedure as being a result of an ineffective organisation of civil justice as
the primary bottleneck, and it is still one of the primary issues in civil
procedure.
2. See also for example Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union and Principle 9 of the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of
Transnational Civil Procedure. This rule is also included in many domes-
tic codes.
3. XV World Congress of Procedural Law, 25-28 May 2015, Istanbul.
4. X.E. Kramer and S. Kakiuchi, ‘Relief in Small and Simple Matters in an
Age of Austerity’, Working paper XV Congress of Procedural Law,
available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2610773>. The general
report is based on nineteen national reports.
cedures typically are procedures for small value and
uncontested claims or similar simple cases that do not
merit a full procedure. The availability of such proce-
dures may evidently contribute to easier and cheaper
access to justice, as they usually have a lower threshold
and require less formalities (e.g. lower court fees, no
legal representation, less documentation). Also for gov-
ernments, these types of procedures may be attractive
from the viewpoint of austerity as those procedures gen-
erally require lesser use of resources.
This issue includes nine articles that each deal with sim-
plified procedures and austerity issues in a particular
jurisdiction. Three articles discuss European jurisdic-
tions: Belgium (Stefaan Voet), England and Wales5
(John Sorabji), and Spain (Laura Carballo Piñeiro and
Jordi Nieva Fenoll). Two articles concern distinct Asian
countries: Israel (Ehud Brosh) and Japan (Etsuko
Sugiyama). One article addresses an African country:
Ghana (Ernest Owusu-Dapaa and Ebenezer Adjei
Bediako). Three articles focus on American jurisdic-
tions; North America: the United States (Manuel
Gomez and Juan Carlos Gomez) and Canada (Jon Silver
and Trevor Farrow), and South America: Brazil (Anto-
nio Gidi and Hermes Zaneti Jr.).
This article will frame and provide an overview of sim-
plified procedures in the nine jurisdictions, discuss the
effects of austerity on civil procedure and the role of
simplified procedures. Most countries have directly or
more indirectly suffered from the recent economic
downturn, with the exception of Brazil, and this has had
a greater or lesser influence on government spending on
the judiciary, legal aid, court fees, litigation behaviour of
parties, and the development of simplified procedures.
In all countries, simplified procedures play a role in the
quest to enhance efficiency in civil justice.
2 Simplified Procedures
2.1 Significance of Simplified Procedures in a
Judicial System
Simplified procedures are court procedures that are dis-
tinguished from fully equipped ordinary civil proce-
dures by curtailing or omitting certain procedural steps.
In most jurisdictions, they are considered a response to
the need for inexpensive and quick procedures, in par-
5. Further referred to as England.
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ticular in simple and small matters.6 However, since the
demand for inexpensive and quick procedures is not
unique to small and simple matters, the significance of
simplified procedures is not always limited to such mat-
ters.
2.1.1 Need for Inexpensive and Quick Procedures in
Simple and Small Matters
The connection between simplified procedures and sim-
ple and small matters can be explained from two per-
spectives, namely the viewpoint of the litigants and that
of the provider of procedural institutions, which is nor-
mally the state.
Firstly, from the litigants’ viewpoint, i.e. the demand
side, an inexpensive and speedy procedure is required if
the amount of the claim is low. Otherwise, litigants
would be deterred from bringing their claim to court,
due to the disproportionate burden of costs and time.
This would be inacceptable from the viewpoint of access
to justice. Thus, from the litigants’ viewpoint, and that
of claimants in particular,7 the value of the claim and the
resources to be spent on the recovery have to be propor-
tionate.
Secondly, from the supply-side perspective, the major
concern is the appropriate allocation of judicial resour-
ces. It is desirable to avoid unnecessary costs and to allo-
cate resources in proportion to the importance of the
matter. As a general rule, if the amount of the claim is
low, it is justified to allocate fewer resources to these
compared to matters of a higher monetary value. How-
ever, other than monetary interests at stake, such as the
desire of furthering the development or uniform appli-
cation of the law, may sometimes lend a matter greater
importance. Hence, in small and simple matters, simpli-
fied procedures are generally preferable to the ordinary
ones from the state’s as well as from the litigants’ per-
spective.8
2.1.2 Demand for Simplification of Procedures in a
Broader Context
It should be noted that the demand for inexpensive and
speedy procedures is not limited to small and simple
matters. It is an ideal for any civil procedure, since every
procedure should be carried out at reasonable cost and
within a reasonable time. Simplification of procedures is
6. See also Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4, at 10-13.
7. The situation changes, however, if one focuses on the interest of the
defendant. See Section 2.2.1 below.
8. However, consideration must be given as to for whom the procedure
should be inexpensive. See Section 2.2.1.
an issue for the whole judicial system.9 This explains the
fact that in some countries, where the problem of costs
of or delays in civil justice is grave, special attention is
paid to simplified and consequently less expensive and
quicker procedures.10 For this reason simplified proce-
dures are of great significance in the context of austeri-
ty.
2.2 Forms and Techniques of Simplified
Procedures
2.2.1 Need for Cost Reduction and the Procedural Design
Concerning the concrete design of simplified proce-
dures, the following remarks can be made. First, the
claimants’ and the defendants’ interests need to be dis-
tinguished. Whereas claimants generally have an incen-
tive to choose a less expensive and speedy procedure,
defendants might prefer a fully equipped procedure
with full procedural guarantees. This raises the question
as to who chooses the procedure and how. Indeed, if
claimants and defendants have different interests, to
which party’s preference should priority be given? This
is also related to the question as to in how far procedural
justice should be guaranteed in such simplified proce-
dures. If a simplified procedure is applicable against one
party’s will, a minimum standard of procedural justice
should be guaranteed.
Second, concerning the costs of procedures, considera-
tion must be given as to for whom the procedure should
be inexpensive. A speedy procedure is speedy for every-
one, but an inexpensive procedure is not necessarily so,
since it depends on how the costs of the procedure are
allocated between the state and the parties. An inexpen-
sive procedure for litigants is generally, but not necessa-
rily, cheap for the state and vice versa.11 Although it is
true that, in most cases, a simplified procedure costs less
than a fully equipped procedure, both for litigants and
the state, how far costs can be reduced depends on the
concrete technique of simplification. Here again, the
question of minimum procedural justice arises, since
there is often a trade-off between the pursuit of cost
reduction, in particular from the perspective of the gov-
ernment, and procedural justice.
Thus, the design of simplified procedures depends on
the way in which different interests, namely the interest
9. It may be added that historically, it was not unusual that a summary
procedure was used practically as the ordinary procedure, as was the
case for the ‘processus summarius’ of the Bavarian Judicial Code (Codex
juris bavarici judiciarii) of 1753. Similarly, there are many instances
where an originally simplified special procedure subsequently replaces
the ordinary procedure, as it was seen in the generalisation of the ‘writ-
ten procedure with the oral closing argument’ (schriftliches Verfahren
mit mündlicher Schlußverhandlung) to the ordinary procedure by an
ordinance of 1846 (Verordnung über das Verfahren in Zivilprozessen
vom 21.6.1846) in Prussia. Moreover, even the whole history of the
Roman civil procedure can be described as a succession of transitions
from an ordinary, formal procedure to a simplified one (from legis
actiones to formulary procedure and from formulary to cognitio proce-
dure).
10. See Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4, at 12-13 for an example from
Egypt.
11. See also Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4, at 12-13 for an example
from Venezuela.
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of the claimant, defendant, and the state, are dealt with,
on the one hand, and the balance between cost reduction
and procedural justice, on the other.
2.2.2 Types of Cases and the Simplification of Procedures
Although, as was discussed in Section 2.1, the need for
simplification of civil procedures is common to the
whole judicial system, small and simple matters are the
field where simplification is most typically needed in
view of the proportionality requirement and is justified
by the limited interests and the simplicity of the case.
The following type of cases can be distinguished, each
requiring a different procedural designs. First, there are
‘small’ matters in the sense of matters of relatively little
importance. A small matter in this sense is often a syno-
nym for a matter having a low monetary value.12 Sec-
ond, there are ‘simple’ matters in the sense that they do
not raise difficult questions of law or fact. Such matters
can be further divided into the following subcategories.
The first category is cases where the opponent party
does not contest the claim. In such cases, the claim can
be enforced without any trial on the merits. A typical
solution for this type of case is the procedure of order
for payment. The second type consists of cases raising
no hard question to resolve, although the opponent par-
ty does contest the claim. This includes, for instance,
cases where there is no question on the interpretation of
the law and the claim or the defence is supported by
strong evidence leaving no reasonable prospect of refu-
tation as well as stereotype cases that fit within a highly
routinised operation.
In short, small and simple matters can be divided into
the following three categories: (i) matters of small
importance, (ii) matters, where the opponent party does
not (manifestly) contest the claim, and (iii) matters
without complicated issues notwithstanding the oppo-
nent party’s objection. From the viewpoint of the
required procedural design, the situation is basically the
same in small matters (type (i)) and cases without com-
plicated issues (type (iii)), whereas uncontested cases
(type (ii)) are a clearly distinguished category. Accord-
ingly, we can place the first group under the general
heading of ‘small and simple matters’ and the second
group more specifically under ‘uncontested cases’.
Whereas summary procedures of a unilateral nature, in
particular the procedure of order for payment, are com-
monly used for uncontested cases, for small and simple
matters generally simplified contradictory (not unilater-
al) procedures are used, although their features vary
considerably per jurisdiction.
2.3 Overview of the Simplified Procedures in the
Nine Jurisdictions
2.3.1 Unilateral Summary Procedure (Order for
Payment)
The aim of unilateral summary procedures – the proce-
dure of order for payment – is to enable claimants to
obtain a title of execution to enforce their claim in a
12. See Section 2.1.1 above.
quick and simple way without formal trial proceedings,
particularly in cases where the claim appears to be
unproblematic and is not contested. This type of proce-
dure has been traditionally used in civil law countries,
particularly in Germany and those countries which were
heavily influenced by the German legal system. Of the
nine jurisdictions discussed in this issue, the procedure
of order for payment or a similar procedure exists in
Belgium, Spain,13 Ghana,14 Japan,15 and Brazil.16 Cana-
da, England,17 Israel, and the United States do not have
an order for payment procedure, but the summary
judgement to some extent fulfils a similar function,
though its scope of application is broader. On the pan
EU level, the European order for payment procedure
was adopted, which is available in cross-border cases
only and on an optional basis.
The main feature of the order for payment procedure is
that the opponent party, the alleged debtor, is not heard
and the claim is not or hardly examined on the sub-
stance. Although the basic structure of the procedure is
the same in the above-mentioned jurisdictions, there are
some differences concerning in particular (i) the struc-
ture of the procedure (two-stage or single-stage proce-
dure18), (ii) the extent to which the court examines the
claim (only formal or a more substantial examination of
the claim), and (iii) the applicability criteria (with or
without financial limit). The German procedure adopts
the combination of a two-stage procedure with only for-
mal examination and no financial limit, which is largely
followed by Japan. The European order for payment
procedure is a single-step procedure where only a limi-
ted review takes place on the basis of a description of the
evidence. A similar procedure exists in Spain. From the
viewpoint of procedural guarantee, a more substantial
review by the court may compensate to some extent the
limitation of the opportunity given to the debtor to
oppose the claim.
Among the nine jurisdiction included in this issue, the
Belgian procedure is a distinct model, as it adopts the
combination of a two-stage procedure with a substantial
examination of the claim by the court. In addition, it is
the only jurisdiction limiting the applicability of the
procedure with a financial limit of 1,860 EUR.19 It is not
13. See Carballo and Nieva in the present issue.
14. Ghana belongs basically to the common law tradition. However, the
procedure referred to as ‘undefended list’ appears to be the equivalent
to the payment order system. See Owusu-Dapaa and Bediako in the
present issue.
15. See Sugiyama in the present issue.
16. The Brazilian procedure is referred to as ‘monitory action’. It should be
noted, however, that this procedure is different from the European
order for payment procedure in terms of the structure and scope. See
Gidi and Zaneti in the present issue.
17. However, as far as cross-border cases are concerned, the European
order for payment procedure (Regulation (EC) 1896/2006 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a
European order for payment procedure) is applicable also in England.
18. In the two-stage procedure, the chance to oppose the claim is given
twice to the debtor, whereas in the single-stage one, such an opportu-
nity is granted in principle just once to the debtor.
19. This limit was abolished for claims falling under the jurisdiction of the
Commercial Court in 2014. However, for other claims, the limit is main-
tained. See Voet in the present issue.
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surprising that this procedure is considered unsuccess-
ful as it is hardly used;20 a reform proposal is pending.
2.3.2 Simplified Contradictory Procedures
As was discussed earlier, simple and small but contested
matters require simplified procedures from the view-
point of the claimant and to some extent that of the
state. At the same time, adequate procedural guarantees
should be in place for the defendant in particular. Such
a small claims procedure exists in most of the nine juris-
dictions, including Brazil, Canada, England, Israel,
Japan, Spain, and the United States, with the exception
of Belgium21 and Ghana.22 In the EU, the European
small claims procedure is currently available in cross-
border cases with a value up to € 2,000.23
In order to provide inexpensive and quick relief, these
procedures make use of various techniques, including (i)
reduced court fees, (ii) shorter timer limits, (iii) use of
standardised forms, (iv) encouraging parties to settle, (v)
limitations on counterclaim, and (vi) limitations on evi-
dence. In addition, in common law countries, rules
applicable to the ordinary procedure, such as rigorous
disclosure and strict rules of evidence, may be exempted
or alleviated. In the small claims procedure in England,
referred to as the ‘small claims track’, disclosure is only
required for documents that parties intend to rely upon,
and strict rules of evidence are excluded.24 Similarly, in
the United States, the often complicated discovery pro-
cess normally does not apply in the small claims proce-
dure.25
As far as the above-mentioned procedural techniques
are concerned, there is little substantial difference
between countries, although the degree of application
varies. However, an interesting divergence appears as
regards the methods applied to examine the case. On the
one hand, in some jurisdictions, the simplified proce-
dure may be conducted in writing. A typical example of
such a procedure is found in Germany.26 Among juris-
dictions discussed in this issue, a written procedure is
available in England, although the consent of both par-
ties is required.27 The same idea of speeding up the pro-
20. The procedure received only 658 filings in 2013, which means 0.1% of
the incoming cases before justices of the peace in Belgium. See Voet in
the present issue.
21. In Belgium, although there is the Justice of the Peace, which is regarded
as a small claims court, its procedure is the same as the ordinary one.
See Voet in the present issue.
22. It appears that there is no procedure specialised in small matters in Gha-
na.
23. This monetary threshold will be raised, see Section 3.2.
24. See Sorabji in the present issue. Similar relaxation of evidence rules is
reported for small claims courts in Israel as well. See Brosh in the pres-
ent issue.
25. See Gomez and Gomez in the present issue.
26. See Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4, at 27-28.
27. It is also worth mentioning that in a few common law countries, where
particular costs and burdens are caused by the formal trial proceeding, it
is important to know how a trial may be avoided. This is why the sum-
mary judgement is emphasised in these countries as a method to
resolve cases without formal oral hearings. See Silver and Farrow, Owu-
su-Dapaa and Bediako and Gomez and Gomez in the present issue. See
further Silver and Farrow in the present issue for summary trial as a
device to simplify the trial instead of avoiding it completely.
cedure and reducing costs by in principle conducting
the procedure in writing is found in the European small
claims procedure. On the other hand, there are several
countries where the orality of the procedure is consid-
ered to be the main feature of the simplified procedure.
This is typically the case for the so-called verbal proce-
dure in Spain, which aims to examine the case in just
one oral hearing.28 In Brazil, orality is one of the major
features of the small claims procedure.29
Another issue on which countries diverge is whether an
appeal is allowed against the decision rendered in a sim-
plified procedure. This question is in fact closely related
to the question of parties’ right to request an ordinary
procedure.30 Whereas there are jurisdictions such as
England,31 which allow appeals without special limita-
tion, the possibility of appeal in the small claims proce-
dure is limited in a few jurisdiction. This is, for
instance, the case in Israel, where an appeal is allowed
only with the leave of the appellate court.32 Japan goes
one step further and fully excludes appeal in the small
claims procedure.33
The actual use of simplified small claims procedures
varies considerably per country. There are some coun-
tries where the procedure is used often. In England, the
vast majority of civil claims are dealt with in the small
claims track.34 The same applies to several major states
in the United States, where a significant use of the small
claims model is reported.35 In contrast to these jurisdic-
tions, in Japan, there were 12,109 filings in the small
claims procedure in 2013, representing a decrease com-
pared to the 23,584 filings in 2005.36
It should be noted that the number of filings does not
always correspond to the attractiveness of the proce-
dure, because it depends to a great extent on whether
the procedure is mandatory or optional.37 In many juris-
dictions the small claims procedure is considered to be
effective, including in particular England, Israel, Japan,
and the United States.
28. See Carballo and Nieva in the present issue.
29. See Gidi and Zaneti in the present issue. Japan may be added to this
group, because in the Japanese procedure for actions on small claims,
the oral hearing constitutes the essential part of the procedure and may
not be omitted. See also Sugiyama in the present issue.
30. See Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4, at 29.
31. See Sorabji in the present issue.
32. See Brosh in the present issue.
33. See Kramer and Kakiuchi, above n. 4, at 30. See also Sugiyama in the
present issue.
34. See Sorabji in the present issue.
35. See Gomez and Gomez in the present issue. See also Silver and Farrow
in the present issue reporting that in Ontario, Canada, over 60% of civil
suits have been handled under the simplified procedure.
36. See Sugiyama in the present issue.
37. It is, thus, not surprising that the English small claims procedure is much
used, because the procedure is basically mandatory for certain catego-
ries of claim. See Sorabji in the present issue.
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3 Austerity Effects on Civil
Procedure and Simplified
Procedures
3.1 Austerity and Civil Procedure
Austerity has a number of effects on civil procedure, as
is also evident from the articles included in this issue.
From the perspective of the government as the supplier
of civil justice, measures are undertaken to ‘economise’
civil procedure, in other words to reduce costs and to
generally make civil procedures more efficient. At the
same time, in times of economic downturn, the
demands of litigating parties may shift. As is clear from
some of the articles, increasing efficiency is not only
imposed by austerity concerns but also aims at making
justice more effective and increasing access to justice for
litigants.38
Not all nine countries discussed in this issue have suf-
fered equally from the recent economic crisis with
resulting austerity measures affecting civil justice. On
the contrary, in Brazil, economic growth during the last
few decades has facilitated investments in the judiciary
and resulted in increased legal aid. It is evident that the
extent to which austerity has an effect on civil procedure
also depends on the government’s contribution to the
financing of the court system and legal aid for parties.
However, at all times, there is a need to keep the judi-
ciary cost within the designated available budget. Some
countries have experienced specific periods of economic
crisis in the past, for instance Israel in 2001-2003,39 or
generally have limited financial resources. Ghana as a
developing country relies heavily on financial support
and investments of developed countries, and its vulnera-
ble economy was consequently affected by the recent
financial crisis.40
3.1.1 The Supply Side of Civil Justice
Austerity primarily influences the overall financing of
the judicial system, the provision of legal aid, court fees,
and the introduction or expansion of simplified court
procedures and alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
For the European Union, the EU Justice Scoreboard of
2015 noted that many Member States were in the pro-
cess of justice reforms that were necessitated, among
others, by the need to cope with budgetary constraints.41
A report of the European Network of Councils for the
38. In relation to Canada, it is stated that there is no empirical evidence to
back up a correlation between austerity measures in response to the
global crisis and the challenges to access to justice that Canada faces.
See Silver and Farrow in the present issue.
39. See Brosh in the present issue.
40. See Owusu-Dapaa and Bediako in the present issue.
41. EU Justice Scoreboard 2015, 3 (Figure 1), available at: <http:// ec.
europa. eu/ justice/ effective -justice/ files/ justice_ scoreboard_ 2015_ en.
pdf>.
Judiciary (ENCJ) also pointed to severe budget cuts in a
number of European countries.42
Budget cuts have been most severe in England and
Spain in recent years. In England, as part of the need to
reduce public spending, the justice budget required
reduction by over a third from 2010 to 2016, and this
has had consequences for the civil courts.43 Eligibility
for legal aid has been dramatically reduced already since
the end of the 1990’s, but was further reduced by 40%
in 2013. At the same time, court fees have been raised
substantially with the aim of ensuring that the English
civil courts are entirely self-funding. In Spain, during
the worst years of the economic crisis, the investment in
justice was dramatically reduced, from €90 per inhabi-
tant in 2010 to €25 in 2012.44 Legal aid is reduced, and
while court fees were abolished in 1986, they were rein-
troduced for legal persons in 2002. A law of 2012
extending court fees to natural persons was eventually
abolished due to public pressure. In Belgium, according
to Voet, austerity has been an important issue for deca-
des and the general perception is that the judicial system
is always underfunded.45
In Japan, the budget for the judiciary was substantially
reduced in the past years.46 Though Israel was not heav-
ily affected by the recent financial crisis there are auster-
ity concerns. These, according to Brosh in the present
issue, correlate heavily with ‘the long-standing Israeli
preoccupation with speeding up justice’ that has resul-
ted in a range of measures to simplify procedures.
Economic downturn in recent years has also had its
effect on the vulnerable economy of Ghana, and Owu-
su-Dapaa and Bediako describe the relationship between
the economy and the effectiveness of the civil justice
system as symbiotic.47 Litigation is relatively expensive
in Ghana, while legal aid is only limitedly available.
They describe the indirect effect of the financial crisis
on civil justice as quite spectacular. There has been a
huge increase in courts fees (400% for filing a notice of
appeal), which is not solely but at least in part a result of
the economic crisis. It particularly affects the position of
low-income citizens. In addition, the activities of several
courts were suspended, increasing the need to travel.
In the United States, the direct effects on civil justice of
governmental cutbacks necessitated by the financial cri-
sis are limited, as Gomez and Gomez explain,48 and as
was noted earlier by Marcus.49 Legal aid provided by
the government has always been limited, and thus, the
economic burden of litigation is transferred to private
litigants. Silver and Farrow analyse the access to justice
42. ENCJ, Judicial Reform in Europe – Report 2011-2012, at 15, available
at: <www. encj. eu/ images/ stories/ pdf/ GA/ Dublin/ encj_ report_ judicial_
reform_ def. pdf>.
43. See Sorabji in the present issue.
44. See Carballo and Nieva in the present issue.
45. See Voet in the present issue.
46. From 333,106 million yen in 2006 to 320,122 million yet in 2011 and
311,100 million yes in 2014. See Sugiyami in the present issue.
47. See Owusu-Dapaa and Bediako in the present issue.
48. See Gomez and Gomez in the present issue.
49. R. Marcus, ‘Procedure in a Time of Austerity’, International Journal of
Procedural Law 3 (2013), at 133-158.
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crisis in Canada, though they underline that there are no
empirical data to back up a correlation between austerity
measures in response to the global crisis and the chal-
lenges of access to justice.50 Litigation is complex and
time consuming, and legal aid is limited, though in
recent years the funding of legal aid has been increased.
An increase in court fees in British Columbia was found
to unconstitutionally restrict access to justice by the
Supreme Court.
In most countries, alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
has been actively promoted in recent years. In all three
European jurisdictions discussed in this issue, mediation
and other forms of out-of-court dispute resolution play
an increasingly important role. This is triggered by
developments at the EU level, where a Mediation
Directive for cross-border cases was adopted in 2008,51
followed by a Directive on Consumer ADR and a Regu-
lation on Consumer ODR (online dispute resolution) in
2013.52 In England, since 2012, small claims are auto-
matically referred to mediation, while retaining the vol-
untary nature of mediation.53 In Belgium, for small con-
sumer disputes, an ADR and ODR system (BelMed)
was introduced in 2011 with a view of keeping these dis-
putes out of the court system. In Spain, way is made to
mediation and consumer arbitration as well.
In other countries, ADR is also on the rise or had
acquired a steady position already, such as in the United
States, Canada, and Japan. In Ghana, ADR is strongly
advocated, and in commercial matters, parties are
obliged to attend a pre-trial settlement conference. In its
2014 Budget Statement, the government underlined the
importance of ADR as a cost-saving mechanism.54 In
relation to Israel, Brosh refers to ‘a vigorous – bordering
on aggressive – promotion of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, especially mediation, in order to induce parties to
settle without trial’.55 In Canada various forms of court-
ordered and court-assisted mediation have emerged as
well as court-assisted court settlement schemes (pre-tri-
al mediation conferences; judicial dispute resolution, or
judicial-assisted dispute resolution).56
Brazil is an outlier in this regard, although ADR is
facilitated by a recent act. Litigation is relatively cheap,
and Brazil is still investing in comprehensive legal aid, a
development that Gidi and Zaneti rightly describe as
being against the worldwide trend of austerity. The
authors warn for facilitating free justice as ‘there is no
free lunch, a Justice entirely dispensed by public entities
50. Silver and Farrow in the present issue.
51. Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial
matters, OJ 2008, L 136/3.
52. Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer
disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive
2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR), OJ 2013, L 165/63 and
Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consum-
er disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive
2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR), OJ 2013, L 165/1.
53. Thus, it is no compulsory mediation, as Sorabji sets out in the present
issue.
54. See Owusu-Dapaa and Bediako in the present issue.
55. See Brosh in the present issue.
56. See Silver and Farrow in the present issue.
must be entirely financed by taxes paid by citizens: this
may not be a sustainable recipe in the long run, as the
European reality has demonstrated’.57
3.1.2 Changing Litigant Behaviour
In most countries, austerity is believed to also have had
an effect on the behaviour of litigants. In several coun-
tries, including Spain, the number of cases increased
during the financial crisis. A direct result in countries
affected by the financial crisis was an proliferation of
certain cases, in particular insolvency cases and debt col-
lection procedures.58
A specific change in the litigation landscape that is par-
ticularly highlighted in the articles on Belgium, Spain,
and Japan is an increased demand for legal aid, which is
vital in particular in small claims cases and other simpli-
fied procedures where consumers are involved. For
instance, in Belgium, the demand has increased steadily
over the past decades and has doubled in recent time. In
2013, the Belgian legislator proposed a set of measures
in an attempt to tackle the ‘budgetary explosion’.59 The
global shift in litigation funding schemes from legal aid
provided primarily or exclusively by the government to
other types of funding60 is in particular highlighted in
the articles on England, Canada, and the United States;
in the latter, legal aid provided by the government has
traditionally been limited. Private legal aid insurance,
third-party funding, and private funding by way of con-
tingency fees are on the rise. Particularly, in the United
States, a fast-growing industry of third-party funding
and crowd funding is noted, the latter also in relation to
small claims cases.
In a number of countries where legal representation is
generally not compulsory, there is an increase in unrep-
resented litigants. In England, as a result of severe cut-
backs on legal aid funding by the government, the num-
ber of litigants in person has steadily increased. As Sor-
abji argues, this challenges the adversarial principle. It
has also led to a rapid increase of litigation assistance by
usually untrained other persons and fee-charging pro-
fessionals (‘McKenzie Friends’), which Sorabji refers to
as ‘counsel of despair’.61 In Ghana, natural persons are
often represented by court clerks, bailiffs, and commis-
sioners of oath because they cannot afford a professional
lawyer, and this weakens their position.62 Pro se litiga-
tion rates have also increased in Canada, and the most
common reason for individuals to represent themselves
is simply because they cannot afford legal counsel.
Despite efforts to tackle the problem of self-representa-
57. See Gidi and Zaneti in the present issue.
58. See also Frans van Dijk and Horatius Dumbrava, ‘Judiciary in Times of
Scarcity: Retrenchment and Reform’, International Journal for Court
Administration 17 (2013), with reference to a questionnaire of the
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ).
59. See Voet in the present issue.
60. For an extensive comparative study on the costs and (changes in) the
funding of civil litigation, see Chris Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & Mag-
dalena Tulibacka, The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation, Oxford,
Oxford University Press (2010).
61. See Sorabji in the present issue.
62. See Owusu-Dapaa and Bediako in the present issue.
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tion, including the establishment of self-help guides – as
they have also emerged in England – this is, according
to Silver and Farrow, a significant concern.63 In the
United States, defendants in small claims debt-collec-
tion cases are usually unrepresented. Though there are
many efforts countrywide to assist unrepresented liti-
gants, Gomez and Gomez note that abuse by debt col-
lecting agencies is a major problem in small claims cases.64
A mirror effect of the wide facilitation of ADR by gov-
ernments is the increased use by justice seekers of vari-
ous forms of out-of-court dispute resolution. In some
countries, (semi) compulsory forms of mediation have
been introduced, including in Ghana and several Cana-
dian provinces. In a number of other countries, ADR is
increasingly used in small claims cases, including Spain,
Belgium, Japan, and the United States. An extensive
report of 2014 on the use of mediation in the EU reveals
that as yet less than 1% of the cases are resolved
through mediation.65 However, it may be expected that
the new European ADR and ODR instruments will
boost consumer mediation.
3.2 The Role of Simplified Procedures
As discussed in Section 2.2, the most common simpli-
fied procedures are the unilateral summary procedure
(order for payment) for the collection of uncontested
debts and simplified contradictory procedures for small
claims, including related mediation schemes. These pro-
cedures have the aim to provide litigants with a speedy,
cheap, and simple procedure, and for the government
they contribute to optimising the allocation of scarce
resources. The uncontested nature or the low value of
the claim justifies a simplified procedure. In this regard,
simplified procedures tie in perfectly with austerity
measures.
In a number of countries, these procedures have been
reformed with a view to austerity and/or with the gen-
eral aim of increasing efficiency of civil justice. For
instance, in Spain and Belgium, the order for payment
procedure was reformed in recent years. For small
claims procedures, the threshold has been raised sub-
stantially in particular in England, Spain, Israel, and
several Canadian provinces. In July 2017, the threshold
for the European small claims procedure will be raised
from € 2,000 to € 5,000.66 In addition, (compulsory)
mediation and ADR schemes have been established for
small value claims in particular in recent years.
Generally, the existing simplified procedures are con-
sidered to be effective, as they reduce the costs of the
63. See Owusu-Dapaa and Bediako in the present issue Silver and Farrow in
the present issue.
64. See Owusu-Dapaa and Bediako in the present issue Gomez and Gomez
in the present issue.
65. Giuseppe De Palo, Leonardo D’Urso, Mary Trevor et al., ‘Rebooting’
the mediation directive: assessing the limited impact of its implementa-
tion and proposing measures to increase the number of mediations in
the European Union, report European Parliament, 2014.
66. Regulation (EU) 2015/2421 of 16 December 2015 amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure
and Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 creating a European order for pay-
ment procedure, OJ 2015, L 341.
procedure, expedite proceedings, and are less burden-
some, in particular for the claimant. In how far they
actually contribute to effective access to justice for liti-
gants depends upon the scope of availability, the proce-
dural design, and their functioning in practice. Though
little empirical data are available to back this up, it may
be assumed that also for the government having effec-
tive simplified procedures in place, where appropriate
coupled with mediation procedures, reduces the judicial
backlog and will be less costly.
In a number of jurisdictions, concerns have been
expressed as to the lack of sufficient protection in sim-
plified procedures. As was mentioned above, there is a
certain trade-off between procedural efficiency and pro-
cedural justice.67 The objective of increasing efficiency
has been on the justice agenda of many countries for a
number of years or even decades. Slow justice is endem-
ic, as is also evidenced by the fact that over one-fourth
of the violation judgements of the European Court of
Justice concern the right to a trial within a reasonable
time.68 Though the importance for expedited justice is
clear, procedural justice should not be sacrificed on the
pyre of increasing efficiency.
The Israeli article expresses concerns on the negative
impact of massive attempts of reducing delays on the
rights of the parties and the quality of judicial work.69 In
the Brazilian article, reference is made to scholarly con-
cerns on the excessive simplification and massification
of civil procedures which may reduce substantive justice
and the protection of procedural rights.
A particular point of attention is the increase of unrep-
resented litigants in this regard, as discussed above.70 In
the United States, an industry has developed where
creditors sell their claims to ‘predatory collectors exploit
the small claims process for profit’.71 This proliferation
of pro se litigation requires an active judge, empower-
ment of litigants by providing accessible information,
access to free legal advice, accessible (online) procedures
and alternative means of adjudication, active consumer
agencies, as well as sufficient review mechanisms.
4 Concluding Remarks
The consequences of austerity and in particular the
global financial crisis are also visible in the civil justice
area. The severity, however, differs per country and also
depends upon the government funding of civil litiga-
tion. For instance, in the United States, where govern-
mental litigation funding is uncommon, the effects are
generally limited. In many other countries, the need to
cut back costs of the judiciary has had an effect among
others on court fees and the provision of legal aid. The
67. Section 2.2.1.
68. Council of Europe, The European Court of Human Rights, ‘50 Years of
Activity: Some Facts and Figures’, 2009, at 6.
69. See Brosh in the present issue
70. Section 3.1.2.
71. See Gomez and Gomez in the present issue.
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design of specific procedures for small and simple mat-
ters fit in with a cost reduction policy and with the
desire to reduce lengthy and complex procedures. There
is a general trend to enhance ADR mechanisms, in par-
ticular in small (consumer) cases, to get these out of the
court system.
While it is inevitable that that in times of cutbacks on
public expenditure the judicial budget is also affected,
countries have to make the necessary investments to
ensure the well-functioning of the judicial system. Not
only for the sake of justice, but also because a well-func-
tioning justice system is considered key to investments
and economic development.72 In global rankings,
including the World Bank Doing Business Reports73
and the Global Competitiveness Reports of the World
Economic Forum,74 civil justice is an important indica-
tor. As is highlighted in the Israeli article, a Euro Sum-
mit Statement of July 2015 on the requirements to con-
tinue financial support to Greece, stresses the need to
adopt a new civil code that overhauls procedures for the
civil justice system, accelerates the procedure and
reduces costs significantly.75 This supports the need of a
well-functioning civil justice system as a prerequisite of
economic welfare.
The simplification and speeding up of civil procedure is
generally considered important but seems to be valued
differently. Exemplary in this regard are the articles on
Canada and Israel in this issue. As Silver and Farrow
discuss, in 2014, the Canadian Supreme Court
expressed the need for a culture shift in civil litigation
towards ‘proportional procedures tailored to the needs
of the particular case’. This Court stated that while the
Canadian system is premised on the values of fairness
and justness, the ‘proportionality principle means that
the best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that
with the most painstaking procedure’.76 The Israeli arti-
cle considers the continuing quest to speed up justice
and the simplification beyond low value and simple
claims as ‘cutting corners’. There are strong concerns
about the rights of the parties and judicial quality. Ref-
erence is made to a statement by a late Israeli Supreme
Court Justice quoted by Brosh, saying that “delayed jus-
tice is preferable to swift injustice”,77 countering the
saying that “justice delayed is justice denied”. This is in
line with concerns on the pursuit for simplification and
acceleration expressed in the Brazilian article.78
72. See also EU Commissioner Jourová in the preface to the EU Justice
Scoreboard of 2015; OECD Economic Policy Paper, Judicial perform-
ance and its determinants: a cross-country perspective, a going for
growth report, June 2013, p. 6.
73. World Bank Group, Doing Business 2016 – Measuring Regulatory Qual-
ity and Efficiency, available at: <www. doingbusiness. org>.
74. World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report
2015-2016, available at: <www. weforum. org/>.
75. Brosh in the present issue. See Council of the European Union, Euro
Summit Statement (SN 4070/15), Brussels, 12 July 2015, available at:
<www. consilium. europa. eu/ en/ meetings/ european -council/ 2015/ 07/
12/>.
76. See Silver and Farrow in the present issue, referring to Hryniak v. Maul-
din, 2014 SCC 7, paras. 2, 27, 28 [2014] 1 SCR 87.
77. See Brosh in the present issue.
78. Section 3.2.
Apprehension for procedural rights and judicial quality
resulting from oversimplification, budgetary constraints
and the financial inability of a party to employ legal rep-
resentation, have to be taken seriously. At the same time
it should be acknowledged that, while the need for cost
reduction may not be the most appropriate incentive for
procedural reform, countries that cannot adjust suffi-
ciently to austerity and to the need to modernise the
judiciary and procedure might in the long term face an
unsustainable civil justice system.
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